A gutted factory outside a Ukrainian city may not look like a military academy. Inside, however, improvised flight rigs and obstacle courses are teaching a new generation of operators how to use small, fast, and cheap drones as weapons. What began as battlefield innovation in Ukraine is now showing signs of being exported to Latin America, with potentially dire consequences for public safety and the region’s security.
How cartel operatives reached Ukrainian training grounds
Intelligence reports and investigations reveal a worrying pattern. Members tied to Mexican cartels and former Colombian fighters apparently entered Ukraine posing as foreign volunteers. Some joined the International Legion and requested placement in units focused on first person view or FPV drone operations. In at least one case a Mexican national using the alias Águila-7 registered with fraudulent Salvadoran documentation and completed advanced drone training in Lviv. His technical skills, including knowledge of electronic warfare countermeasures and ways to avoid thermal detection, raised suspicion among Ukrainian instructors.
Ukrainian security services have launched probes after Mexico’s National Intelligence Center raised the alarm. The investigations focus on Spanish-speaking units within the International Legion, especially the tactical group Ethos operating in Donetsk and Kharkiv. Reports suggest that private security firms and networks across Latin America helped move recruits, sometimes using forged documents and front companies to hide cartel links.
What Ukraine is teaching about drones
Ukraine’s battlefield needs have driven rapid innovation. Training curricula taught to volunteers include drone manufacturing, tactical deployment, resistance to electronic warfare, and real-time battlefield coordination. FPV tactics range from low-cost racing platforms to more complex systems such as octocopter relay networks, AI-assisted guidance, and even fiber-optic tethering for unjammable links. That mix of low cost and high precision is what makes these tactics attractive to nonstate actors.
Ukrainian units have refined ways to fly drones through dense cover, navigate urban obstacles, and precisely strike targets. These are transferable skills. A Kyiv security official warned that volunteers can learn how to weaponize inexpensive platforms and then sell that knowledge to the highest bidder.
Which cartel elements are learning and training
Open source reporting links recruits to Mexico and Colombia, including former members of elite military units and insurgent groups. Analysts flagged cases involving ex-GAFE personnel whose skills have, in the past, flowed into cartel ranks. Former FARC fighters also appear in the reports, some arriving with forged Panamanian or Venezuelan documents. Intelligence suggests cartel-linked entities organized relocations to Ukraine so these operatives could acquire battlefield-grade drone tradecraft.
The concern is not only the individuals but also the network. Private security outfits and intermediaries appear to have coordinated placements, providing a pipeline that moves skilled operators from conflict zones back to criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere.
Latin American criminal groups have already adopted a variety of drone tactics. In Mexico, groups use quadcopters to drop grenades or to scout positions. One-way attack drones that carry explosives and detonate on contact have been documented as early as April 2025. Videos and social media show cartel members discussing how to configure drones for these attacks. In Colombia, rebel groups have used explosive-armed drones to strike security forces, with reports of deadly incidents and attacks on riverine patrol boats.
Cartels have also adapted defensive and countermeasures. Narco-tanks and improvised armored vehicles sometimes sport anti-drone cages and even jammers. Foot soldiers have been photographed with handheld anti-drone jammers and GPS spoofing tools. There is also evidence of experimentation with fiber-optic FPV systems and advanced relay techniques, though these are less common because they trade mobility for signal security.
Beyond the air, criminal networks are innovating at sea. Colombian authorities interdicted a semi-submersible narco-submarine controlled remotely via a Starlink terminal. Drone narco-subs offer stealth, longer loitering times, and more cargo space because they do not carry crews.
Security forces in the region have seized weaponized drones, narco-submarine craft, and other improvised unmanned systems. Videos and documentary evidence show captured drones that failed to detonate, and authorities have intercepted semi-submersibles and other drone-enabled smuggling devices. Seizures show both the growing use and the limitations of current countermeasures.
The drone advantage
Drones offer several advantages compared with traditional cartel tactics. They are inexpensive to build and deploy, allowing small teams to project force with minimal logistical overhead. FPV drones provide precision in cluttered environments, able to navigate vegetation and buildings and strike weak top armor on military vehicles and troop transports. One-way attack drones are effectively guided missiles that destroy themselves on impact, reducing the need for recovery and reuse.
Drones also lower the barrier to entry for complex attacks. An operator trained in FPV techniques can guide a small drone into narrow openings or over cover where grenades and conventional weapons would be less effective. Drones can be used for surveillance, target acquisition, resupply, and direct attack. They allow cartels to blend reconnaissance and strike capabilities in ways that were previously the domain of formal militaries.
Latin American states are scrambling to respond. Governments are buying unarmed reconnaissance drones and experimenting with domestic drone bombers like Colombia’s Dragom. But the spread of weaponized drones raises legal and ethical questions about arming state forces in ways that can increase civilian harm.
Security analysts recommend tighter intelligence sharing between Mexico, Ukraine, and the United States, more investment in counter-drone detection and jamming, and disruption of parts supply chains. They also urge treating cartels as hybrid actors that can behave like multinational corporations, requiring coordinated international responses.
At the tactical level, eliminating trained operators could be more effective than destroying individual drones, which can be cheaper than the munitions used against them. Yet operators trained abroad can adapt, prompting concerns about autonomous launches or AI-enabled systems in the future.
The migration of battlefield drone tradecraft from Ukraine to Latin America is a wake-up call. Cheap, adaptable, and precise, FPV and other drone tactics magnify the destructive capacity of criminal groups. Seizures and social media footage show cartels moving quickly to integrate drones into complex operations. The task for governments is urgent. Intelligence, counter-drone investments, and cross-border cooperation could blunt the threat. Without rapid and sustained action, the same technology that helped defend territory in one theater could empower nonstate actors to challenge sovereignty and endanger civilians in another.
